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FEDERALISM BY WAIVER AFTER
THE HEALTH CARE CASE
Samuel R. Bagenstos

The Supreme Court's Spending Clause holding in National Federation of
Independent Businesses v. Sebelius (NFIB) is likely to be consequential for many
reasons. It will have a direct effect on the implementation of the Affordable Care
Act (ACA), which relied on the expansion of Medicaid-now made voluntary
by the Court-to obtain health care coverage for more than fifteen million previously uninsured people. At this writing, it remains unclear how many states
will participate in the expansion. The Congressional Budget Office recently estimated that, as a result of the Court's decision, three million fewer people will
obtain new Medicaid coverage under the law than it had originally predicted. 1
But the Court's Spending Clause ruling will have potentially an even more
far-reaching effect on the constitutionality of other federal statutes enacted
pursuant to Congress's spending power, as states will be prompted to challenge
other conditional spending laws in the education, social welfare, environmental, and civil rights areas as unconstitutionally coercive. The ultimate legal effect
of NFIB's Spending Clause holding on these laws is unlikely to be determined
without years of litigation.
In this chapter, I focus on another likely effect of NFIB's Spending Clause
holding- the case's effect on the day-to-day bargaining between states and
the federal agencies that administer cooperative spending programs. 2 I argue
that NFIB gives states important new leverage in these negotiations. This new
leverage is likely to accelerate the trend toward "federalism by waiver;' in which
important questions about the federal-state relationship are resolved by the federal executive branch granting tailored, conditional exemptions from the broad,
general spending conditions adopted by Congress. And I will argue that this is
not necessarily a bad thing.3
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1. The Rise of Federalism by Waiver
As far as I can tell, Professor Hugh Heclo was the first academic to use the term
"federalism bywaiver." 4 The term refers to a pattern in the administration ofcooperative state-federal spending statutes in which the federal executive branch has
taken an increasingly large role. Federal conditional spending statutes typically
impose detailed and prescriptive obligations on states. These obligations come
directly from the statutory language adopted by Congress. But Congress has recognized that the detailed statutes it adopts cannot take account of all local conditions, and it has also recognized a value in giving states space to experiment with
new means of achieving the goals of those statutes. Accordingly, at least since the
1960s, Congress has included provisions in its major conditional spending statutes that empower the federal agency that administers a given spending program
to grant waivers of the statutes' requirements in various circumstances.5
Waivers like this might play a distinctly marginal and interstitial role. They
might simply address particular circumstances that Congress did not anticipate.
Or they might provide for narrowly drawn and carefully evaluated demonstration projects designed to build policy knowledge that Congress could take into
account in subsequent reauthorizations of the statute. And, indeed, those seem
to have been the occasions in which Congress anticipated that states would seek,
and the federal executive branch would grant, waivers from the basic obligations
imposed by conditional spending programs.6
But beginning in the 1980s, states and the federal executive branch cooperated
to transform the use of waivers in cooperative spending programs. The transformation began during the Reagan administration, as the executive branch encouraged widespread use of waivers in the Medicaid program to promote home- and
community-based services, and in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program to jump-start a process of welfare reform. 7 These efforts carried out one of the original purposes of the waiver authority-to promote policy
experimentation-but they occurred on such a wide scale that waivers were no
longer a marginal or interstitial tool.
The George H. W. Bush administration was, in general, less interested in
using waivers of conditional spending legislation as a policy tool. Indeed, the
administration denied the most prominent request for such a waiver during its
time in office-the waiver encompassing Oregon's ambitious effort to reform
its Medicaid system. 8 As his reelection campaign picked up in 1992, however,
President Bush did grant some notable waivers in the welfare area. 9
Broad use ofthe waiver tool really took off during the Clinton administration. 10
President Clinton had been an innovative governor himself, and he came to the
presidency determined to use waiver authorities aggressively to enable other
governors to innovate as well. While his own welfare reform legislation stalled
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in Congress during the first few years of his administration, President Clinton
sought to burnish his record as a welfare reformer by approving a number of
states' requests for significant and far-reaching waivers of various requirements
imposed by the AFDC program. And especially after the defeat of his health
care plan in 1994, President Clinton used Medicaid waivers to promote health
reform-and particularly to encourage states to move to more comprehensive
coverage and cost controls imposed by managed care- on a state-by-state basis.
By the end of the Clinton administration, federalism by waiver had become a key
means for both the federal executive branch and the states to escape the detailed
strictures of conditional spending statutes.
Notably; the Clinton administration was relatively ecumenical in the waivers it would approve. Prior to the enactment of comprehensive welfare reform
legislation in 1996, the Clinton administration approved AFDC waivers that
embraced a variety of different-and even conflicting- visions of the appropriate way to reform welfare. 11 A similar pattern was evident in the Medicaid area
after the collapse of Clintoncare in 1994. 12
The George W. Bush administration consolidated the rise of federalism by
waiver. In 2002, it even sought from Congress the authority to issue "super
waivers"-waivers that could dispense with the requirements ofa range ofdifferent federal spending programs, often administered by different cabinet departments, in a single administrative act. The general "super waiver" legislation
passed the House but died in the Senate.13 (Congress did, however, grant the
Secretary of Homeland Security a form of "super waiver" authority in connection with the construction of a border fence.) 14
But the Bush administration also sought, much more aggressively than had
the Clinton administration, to use waivers as a tool to achieve the President's
substantive policy goals. Where the Clinton administration had seen flexibility
and devolution as important ends in themselves, the Bush administration saw
the waiver process largely in terms of the substantive results it could achieve.
In the Medicaid area, the administration's Health Insurance Flexibility and
Accountability (HIFA) initiative "encourage[d] states to finance expansions of
coverage of the uninsured population through cuts in the optional services they
currently provide[d]:'15 To many critics, HIFA appeared to reflect a backdoor
effort by the Bush administration to implement its preferred block grant model
for the program, in which Medicaid would no longer be an entitlement. 16 And
in the education area, the administration's Department of Education took a hard
line against waiver requests that would have provided relief from the strictures of
President Bush's signature No Child Left Behind legislation.17
The Obama administration has also aggressively used waivers of conditional
spending statutes as a policy tool. In doing so, it has adopted elements of both the
Clinton administration's and the George W. Bush administration's approaches.
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The Obama administration has used its Medicaid waiver authority to grant broad
flexibility to the states in providing health care to indigent and disabled persons.
Unlike in the second Bush administration, these waivers have not followed a
particular substantive pattern. As in the Clinton administration, flexibility itself
seems to have been the Obama administration's immediate goal. Part of the
explanation for this may lie in the background of President Obama's Secretary of
Health and Human Services, Kathleen Sebelius. As a former governor and state
insurance commissioner, Sebelius had an appreciation for the importance oflocal
conditions and state innovation in health care provision. But a more significant
part of the explanation, I think, was the overriding importance President Obama
placed on obtaining support for-and blunting the constitutional challenges
to-the ACA, his signature measure. The ACA required state cooperation in its
Medicaid expansion and in its system of health insurance exchanges. With the
statute already a target of vigorous political attack, Obama administration officials
felt an acute need not to unnecessarily alienate the state officials on whom they
would rely for its implementation. And with the Medicaid expansion specifically
under attack in the courts for being burdensome on and coercive of the states,
administration officials were keen to limit the burdens imposed by Medicaid to
the extent that they could do so. The administration (in a process implemented
by the Department of Health and Human Services [HHS], but encouraged, if not
driven, by the White House) thus adopted a relatively general policy of flexibility
toward states' efforts to carry out their obligations under the ACA. 18
In the education area, the Obama administration has been much more open
to granting waivers than had the George W. Bush administration. But like the
Bush administration, it has used its waiver authority to push its own substantive vision of education policy. Amid widespread discontent with the strictures
imposed by the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), and a deadlock in Congress
regarding how to change the statute, the Obama administration has offered to
waive many of the statute's requirements for states that adopt the core elements
of the administration's own preferred NCLB revision. 19 Some commentators
have decried this offer as working an end run around Congress. But even some
critics see the Obama administration's approach as a responsible, if not ideal,
response to the legislative gridlock that has prevented Congress from updating
an unpopular and perhaps impractical statute. 20
Throughout his administration, President Obama's openness to waivers of
the requirements of cooperative spending (and other) statutes has drawn criticism from right-wing critics. 21 These criticisms tended to lie at the margins of
mainstream discourse until President Obama's HHS issued a letter, responding
to requests made by a number of Republican governors, that expressed a willingness to entertain requests for waivers of certain of the work requirements of the
1996 welfare reform legislation. 22 HHS made clear that any request for waiver of
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those requirements would have to show how it would promote work by public
assistance recipients, and it has not yet granted any such waiver. Nonetheless,
Governor Romney's presidential campaign seized on the Obama administration's mere statement that it would entertain requests for waivers of 1996 legislation's work provisions and exploited that statement to argue (with some effect)
that President Obama is gutting welfare reform. 23

2. WHY THE HEALTH CARE CASE SHOULD
ACCELERATE THE TREND
Because the statutes that authorize waivers of federal funding conditions are
phrased in highly discretionary terms, one might hypothesize that, all else
equal, a presidential administration will use the waiver authority to achieve
its more general policy goals. When an administration's policy preferences are
well reflected in the rules adopted by Congress (as was the case for the Bush
administration in education policy after the passage of NCLB), we can expect
the administration to grant relatively few waivers. When, by contrast, an administration has been unable to get Congress to adopt its preferred policy (as has
been the case for the Obama administration in education policy, as efforts to
reauthorize and reform NCLB have stalled), we can expect the administration
to grant more waivers, but to grant only those waivers that serve its substantive
policy preferences. And when an administration has a general policy preference
toward devolution (as was the case for the Clinton administration in the AFDC
and Medicaid programs), we can expect the administration to grant more waivers across the board.
But the incumbent presidential administration's policy preferences are not
the only crucial variable here. Each waiver of a federal spending condition
results from an iterative, negotiated process, in which the states hold a number of
important cards. The process may be initiated by the federal agency that administers a given cooperative spending program, which can (formally or informally)
let states know that it will entertain requests for particular sorts of waivers. Or
the process may be initiated by individual states, or groups ofstates, themselves.
These states may simply submit applications for individual waivers, or (as they
did when they triggered the recent controversy over Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families [TANF] waivers) they may ask the administration for more general guidance about what sorts of waiver requests it will entertain.
O nce this process begins, a state has a number of bargaining advantages.
States can sometimes threaten to opt out of a federal spending program entirely
if the administration refuses to waive rules they find particularly noxious. Where
this threat is credible, as it will occasionally be (especially for programs in which
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the amount of federal money at stake for any given state is low), the federal officials who administer the program will be strongly inclined to grant the waiver in
order to salvage as much of the program as they can. For similar reasons, federal
agencies virtually never cut off all funds to states that fail to comply with the
terms of a given program, even though the relevant statute will often authorize
such a sanction. Federal officials simply do not want to harm a program's beneficiaries by cutting off funds to a noncompliant state. 24
Even where the state lacks a credible opt-out option, the dynamics of the
waiver negotiation process push toward approval of waiver requests. For one
thing, the career officials who staff the federal agencies that administer cooperative spending programs have extensive day-to-day contacts with the state
officials to whom they provide money-far more extensive contacts than they
have with anyone else. They receive most of their information from those state
officials. All of these interactions engender a felt affinity and association between
the interests of state and federal officials working on cooperative programs. 25
This affinity and association is enhanced by the career paths of the officials
who work in federal spending agencies. Those officials often move back and
forth between state and federal government jobs. The typical federal office
administering a cooperative program will contain a large number of staff who
formerly worked-and/ or expect to work in the future-for the state agencies
receiving the office's money. They thus will readily be sympathetic to the state's
perspective and its analysis of the possibilities and constraints available to those
implementing federal policy on the ground. 26
The argument in the preceding two paragraphs is in some ways the flip side of
the oft-expressed argument against "picket fence federalism:' 27 As generally presented, that argument asserts the existence of an alliance between federal- and
state-level subject-matter expert bureaucrats, who join together to overcome
resistance to a federal program's goals from politicians and generalist agency officials at the state level. But the alliance can cut in both directions. Subject-matter
experts in the federal bureaucracy, supporting their allies in state government,
can work to overcome the resistance of generalist federal officials to state-level
innovations. As Frank]. Thompson and Courtney Burke argue, the rise of federalism by waiver helps to deepen and problematize the standard argument against
picket fence federalism. 28
And the congressional connection is especially important. Federal agencies are responsive to members of the House and Senate-particularly, but not
exclusively, those on the agencies' authorizing committees or appropriations
subcommittees. And those legislators are often extremely responsive to the
desires of the governing administration in their home states. Agency officials'
desire to please important constituencies in Congress thus will lead them to seek
to please the governments of the states with whom they deal. 29 Steven Teles's
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important study of welfare policy prior to the 1996 welfare reform legislation
accordingly emphasized the role of states' congressional delegations in "act[ing]
in concert to put pressure on the executive branch to expedite the processing
of ... waiver proposal [s] :•3o
To the extent that members of Congress see particular sorts ofwaiver requests
through a policy rather than a casework lens, they may be more skeptical of those
requests and work to undermine them or bar them by appropriations riders or
statutory amendments. The recently proposed requests for waivers of TANF's
work requirements may fall into this category.31 For the ordinary run of waiver
requests, however, congressional delegations are likely to push in the same direction as their states' governors.
These dynamics do not ensure that the states will always get their way. To
the contrary, the policy preferences of the incumbent presidential administration will also play a substantial role in determining which waiver requests will be
granted. But, notwithstanding the broad discretion that the statutes authorizing
waivers grant to the administration as a formal matter, the administration faces
substantial constraints in exercising that discretion.
The Supreme Court's ruling in NFIB is likely to shift the waiver-bargaining
dynamic-at least for a time-in an even more state-friendly direction. 32 By
holding, for what Justice Ginsburg emphasized was "the first time ever,"33 that a
federal spending condition had coerced the states, the Court in NFIB gave states
a new tool to use in their negotiations with federal agencies. Despite the suggestions of scholars such as Gillian Metzger that "greater scrutiny appears warranted
when waiver authority is sought by a state and the waiver denial significantly
restricts state regulatory autonomy," the courts have generally reviewed waiver
denials "quite deferentiallY:' 34 On some occasions in the past, states that unsuccessfully sought administrative exemptions from certain conditions imposed on
federal funding recipients turned to the courts to argue that the conditions were
unconstitutionally coercive. But that litigation typically proved unavailing. 35
Now, a state that does not receive the waiver it requested can threaten-more
credibly than before NFIB-to challenge the constitutionality of the underlying
spending program if the administering agency refuses its requested waiver.
But it is not just the fact that the Court found a spending condition unconstitutionally coercive that enhances states' bargaining positions. The language and
reasoning in the ChiefJustice's pivotal Spending Clause opinion may prove especially helpful to states in threatening to sue if waivers are denied. In concluding
that the ACA'.s Medicaid expansion provisions unconstitutionally coerced the
states, Chief Justice Roberts found it crucial that the expansion did not, in his
view, simply make changes to the existing Medicaid program. Rather, it required
states that wished to continue participating in that program also to participate in
what he regarded as a "new health care program"-one that had different federal
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reimbursement rules and mandated a different benefits package that would apply
to individuals who were eligible for preexpansion Medicaid. 36 That Congress
sought to tie together what he thought were really separate and independent
grants was key to the Chief Justice's conclusion. He argued that when federal
funding conditions "take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the
States to accept policy changes:'37 And he agreed with the plaintiff-states that the
threat to bar future access to all Medicaid funds to states that failed to participate
in the (in his view separate) Medicaid expansion "serves no purpose other than
to force unwilling States to sign up for the dramatic expansion in health care
coverage effected by the Act:'38
This language might be understood as holding that Congress may not tie
together conceptually or budgetarily separate programs in a single offer of federal
funds. If a state wishes to accept federal funds to participate in one program, what
reason could Congress have for denying it those funds for refusal to participate
in some other program-aside from "forc[ing] unwilling States to sign up for"
that other program? This reasoning has obvious implications for waiver requests.
Imagine that a state is willing to participate in the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act (ESEA) Title I program but is not willing to provide Title I funds
to students enrolled in private schools, as required by NCLB. 39 Although the
statute by its terms requires participating states to provide Title I funds to eligible private school students, the state agrees to forgo the federal money that
would go to those students if it can obtain a waiver of that requirement. After
NFIB, the state can credibly threaten that, if the waiver is denied, it will challenge
the tying together of private and public school populations as unconstitutionally
coercive-the only reason to tie them together, the state might say, is to force
unwilling states to provide public funds to private school students.
I argue elsewhere that this is too broad a reading of the ChiefJustice's opinion.40 In my view, that opinion is best read not simply as prohibiting the tying
together of two analytically or budgetarily separable funding streams, but
instead as prohibiting a particular kind ofleveraging. The Chief Justice's opinion bars Congress from telling states that they can continue to participate in an
entrenched and lucrative cooperative spending federal program only if they also
agree to participate in a new and independent program. It thus should not prohibit Congress from bundling together various separable funding streams from
the start. The ChiefJustice's opinion does not treat every analytically or budgetarily separable funding stream as reflecting an independent program in any event.
Rather, the ChiefJustice accepted that the many changes Congress had made to
Medicaid itself through the years, including adding new mandatorily covered
populations and new required services, merely "altered" the existing Medicaid
program; it was only the very large expansion demanded by the ACA that sought
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to tie that existing program to an independent program. Finally, the ChiefJustice
limited his coercion analysis to those instances in which the amount of money
a state stood to lose was so great as to deny states a real choice "not merely in
theory but in fact:' 41
A federal agency that is sued for unconstitutional coercion after denying a
waiver ought therefore to have three possible defenses against such a suit: first
(if this is true), that the condition the agency refused to waive was not a new
condition but existed from the time Congress created the program; second, that
the condition the agency refused to waive was not independent from the conditions that the state had agreed to accept; and third, that the amount of money at
stake is not so great as to deny the state a realistic choice. But it will take some
time for the courts to settle on a reading of NFIB's Spending Clause holdingparticularly if agencies seek to avoid litigation of these issues.
In the interim, agencies faced with waiver requests must engage in risk management. They must decide how willing they are to risk a holding that the statutes
they administer are unconstitutionally coercive. Given the great harm to those
agencies if that risk eventuates-harm in unsettling expectations and in keeping
the agencies from providing the services that they are set up to provide-they
can be expected in many circumstances to be unwilling to take the risk. This is
particularly likely to be true because what constitutes an "independent" program
remains quite uncertain after the NFIB decision-and Chief Justice Roberts
expressly overrode Congress's determination that the ACXs Medicaid expansion merely added to the existing Medicaid program without creating a separate
program. By contrast, if the agency grants a questionable waiver request, it is
unlikely even to be held to account by the courts. The erosion of private rights
of action to enforce spending statutes, the difficulty in finding a plaintiff with
standing, and the generally deferential posture of courts toward waiver grants
will make granting the request the path ofleast resistance for the agency. 42
The uncertainty created by NFIB's Spending Clause holding is thus likely to
embolden states to seek more and more extensive waivers of federal spending
conditions. And it is likely, at least at the margins, to encourage federal agencies to grant those waivers more frequently. The NFIB case is therefore likely to
accelerate the trend toward federalism by waiver.

3. An Initial Normative Assessment
Is the trend toward federalism by waiver, which the NFIB decision is likely to
accelerate, something to be welcomed? Or to be greeted warily? Federalism by
waiver-and the connected though broader phenomenon that has been labeled
"government by waiver" 43 -has drawn substantial criticism from both liberals
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and conservatives. These critics charge that increasing use of the waiver authority undermines both the goals set by Congress for particular statutes and, ultimately, the rule oflaw itsel£
Although there is an essential similarity between the liberal and conservative criticisms of federalism by waiver, the criticisms sound in different registers. Liberal critics express a concern for statutory erosion. They contend that
waivers have been used to undermine hard-won statutory requirements that
would otherwise bind states to provide important services to less privileged and
less empowered individuals and communities. States may also use waivers as a
vehicle to cut costs during recessions-the worst possible time, from a programmatic perspective, to cut aid to poor people. 44 At their worst, waivers may enable
states to reprogram redirect money that had been designated for poor people
and people with disabilities and divert it to less needy groups. 45
For conservatives, the criticisms of federalism by waiver form part of a larger
rule-of-law argument against the exercise of executive discretion in the administration of complex federal programs. The argument runs that constraints on
discretion are necessary to avoid arbitrary, favoritistic, and rent-seeking uses of
executive power, and to ensure that parties that operate in a space with extensive federal involvement can plan and order their affairs. Although quite common in early conservative challenges to the rise of the New Deal administrative
state, these rule-of-law arguments had migrated to a narrow fringe view until the
Obama administration's domestic policy efforts engendered Tea Party opposition and brought them back into the mainstream of conservative legal thought.46
I have a more optimistic view offederalism by waiver. The concerns regarding
statutory erosion are real, but they must be considered in the light of the realistic
alternatives to waivers. These alternatives, in tum, are likely to depend on the
nature of the spending condition that a state is asking the federal government to
waive. Where the spending condition forms a relatively minor part of a complex
scheme, a state that could not obtain a waiver might simply refuse to comply
and expect to get away with it. Federal agencies are unlikely to terminate funding for relatively minor violations of the rules governing a spending program. 47
And the avenues for third-party private enforcement of those rules have been
increasingly closed off by the Supreme Court's restrictive private-right-of-action
jurisprudence.48
The alternative to a waiver regime in these cases is thus likely to be a regime
of de facto waivers determined by ability of the incumbent administration to
detect violations and its willingness to threaten fund cutoffs over them-a willingness that will necessarily depend on the administration's enforcement priorities, but that will often occur out of public view and accountability. An overt
waiver regime provides a mechanism for federal agencies to engage states before
they depart from the strict requirements of funding statutes; to negotiate for
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provisions that preserve the key goals, according to the administration, of the
statutes at issue; and to do so in a context that preserves a measure of public
accountability. And where states pass up an opportunity to obtain waivers and
instead simply violate the law in the hope that they will not get caught, the disregard of the waiver process will justify enforcement actions that might not be
triggered by the state's violation in and of itsel£
Federal agencies have often undertaken to give states and interested parties
advance public notice of the criteria they will apply to waiver requests. Programs
in which the Obama administration has undertaken to provide such advance
notice include Medicaid (in which the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services have published detailed criteria for assessing home- and communitybased services waiver requests ) 49 and N CLB. 50 Indeed, the attacks on the Obama
administration for "gutting" TANF's work requirement arose, not after HHS
granted a waiver of that requirement ( as of this writing, it still has not granted any
such waiver), but after the Department published a notice informing states of the
criteria it would apply in considering such a request.51 Whatever one thinks of the
merits of the very public political and legal dispute that ensued, the prominence
of that dispute highlights a way in which executive branch waivers of statutory
spending conditions can enhance public accountability.
Where the spending condition at issue is a more central requirement of the
statute at issue-as is the case in many of the large Medicaid waivers and waivers
of NCLB-the calculus is different. If waivers are not available in these cases,
states that find themselves unable or unwilling to comply with the conditions
may choose simply to opt out of the spending program entirely5 2-or to lobby
in Congress for fundamental changes to the program that can have nationwide
effects. Allowing waivers of such central requirements does take away some of
the leverage that Congress presumably sought to employ to impel states to agree
to those requirements. But if the alternative is a state opting out of the statute
entirely-or a state prompting statutory changes that undermine these requirements in all states-the availability of a waiver provides a second-best option. In
this way, as Professors Thompson and Burke have shown, a waiver regime can
provide a safety valve that preserves conditional spending programs at the same
time that it relieves states of some of the obligations these programs impose. 53
As Theodore Ruger argues in his contribution to this volume, waivers can be
used to accommodate state concerns with particular implementation rules while
firmly entrenching the cooperative spending programs that authorize them. 54
The executive branch, in exercising its waiver authority, can say yes only in those
cases in which executive officials believe that the state will opt out of the program entirely if the waiver is denied, and it can otherwise exercise its leverage in
the waiver process to negotiate waiver terms that promote its understanding of
the statutory goals to the extent possible.
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For the conservative rule-of-law critics, this degree of executive discretion
is itself the problem. But their argument ultimately rests on a rejection of delegation-a rejection that would call into question huge swaths of the modem
administrative state.55 To be sure, one might accept the delegation inherent in the
modem administrative state-if only as an accommodation to the reality that it
will not be rolled back any time soon-but still argue that extensive reliance on
executive waivers goes too far. 56 But this would be perverse. As David Barron
and Todd Rakoff argue, the delegation inherent in waiver authority seems on
balance to be less problematic from the perspective of accountability and congressional control than are more traditional delegations. 57 The most plausible
justification for drawing a line of permissible delegation that forbids extensive
use of waivers would be to raise the costs to Congress of imposing extensive
and detailed conditions on federal spending.58 An antiwaiver (or anti-too-extensive-reliance-on-waiver) principle could thus be understood as what Ernest
Young has called a "resistance norm": a norm that "makes it harder-but still
not impossible-for Congress to write statutes that intrude into areas of constitutional sensitivity:'59 For those who are grudging at best about the New Deal
Settlement and its instantiation in the federalism arrangements of Great Society
programs, limitations on federalism by waiver will no doubt be attractive. But
for those of us who are comfortable with those basic federalism arrangements,
limiting the use of waivers will lead to suboptimal policy outcomes without sufficient countervailing benefits.
The critics, in my view, fail to account for the positive contributions of a robust
waiver regime to good policy and governance. A robust waiver regime can serve
as a tool to negotiate the proper boundary between national standards and local
variation, but with lower stakes, and at a lower temperature, than a regime that
imposes strict statutory standards on states and provokes them to challenge those
standards on constitutional grounds. Reliance on the waiver mechanism helps to
realize many of the benefits of decentralization-notably the benefits of experimentation and accounting for local variation-within the context of a national
program. In the Medicaid program, for example, the executive branch employed
waiver-based demonstration projects to develop models for providing community-based services to older people and people with disabilities. These included the
Long-Term Care Channeling Demonstration in twelve states in the early 1980s,60
which laid the groundwork for the Home- and Community-Based Waiver program, and the Cash-and-Counseling Demonstration in three states in the 2000s.61
Policymakers in both federal and state governments have learned substantial lessons from demonstrations like these; those lessons have helped them provide
more effective-and more cost-effective-community-based services. 62
A robust waiver regime can also provide a means ofupdating or revising statutory regimes that prove impractical or ill-conceived in the face of experience, but
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that, because of veto points in Congress, cannot be comprehensively revised. 63
The Obama administration's extensive use of waivers in the education area provides the best example here. Vanishingly few state or federal officials are happy
with NCLB as it stands, but it has proven impossible to date to assemble a legislative coalition to reauthorize and amend that law. The Obama administration
has offered states a way out of NCLB's unpopular strictures, but only on the
condition that those states adopt policies that fit the administration's own preferred policy in the area. This waiver regime helps to bring the statute up to date,
but it also focuses attention-and accountability-on the executive branch's
own clearly expressed policy preferences. 64 There may be substantial reasons
to object to the Obama administration's approach on its policy merits. 65 But the
administration's use of the waiver tool has ensured that its policy decisions are
made in full view of the public and that the states and Congress can push back if
they are so disposed. 66
A regime that relies heavily on executive branch waivers certainly has its
dangers. The critics are right that waivers can be used by an administration that
is hostile to a conditional spending statute as a tool to undermine that law. So,
too, can waivers be used to facilitate rent-seeking or other arbitrary or venal
conduct. As a practical matter, however, a hostile or venal administration has
ample opportunity to undermine the requirements of a conditional spending
statute simply by failing to enforce its terms against noncompliant states. Given
the erosion of private rights of action and the extremely limited (at best) judicial review of an agency's failure to take enforcement action, there is likely to be
no effective legal check on an agency that is bound and determined to resist the
requirements Congress has imposed on states that receive federal funds. The
most effective checks are likely to be political. And a waiver regime, honestly
engaged, can provide the opportunity for political debate, contestation, and
accountability.
I have argued that the Spending Clause ruling in NFIB v. Sebelius is likely to
have a significant impact that goes beyond the Medicaid expansion provisions
of the ACA. That ruling will affect the entire range of day-to-day bargaining
between states and the federal executive branch in the administration of cooperative spending programs. Because NFIB marked the first time the Supreme
Court invalidated a spending condition as coercing the states-and because of
the structure and ambiguities of ChiefJustice Roberts's pivotal opinion on the
question-the case is likely, at least in the short term, to accelerate the trend
toward federalism by waiver.
And, I have argued, that may not be such a bad thing.Arobustwaiverregime can
achieve many of the goals of decentralization-experimentation and accounting
for differences among the states-within the context of a program that serves
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objectives set by Congress and policed by the federal executive branch. A robust
waiver regime provides a means of updating and harmonizing outdated or conflicting statutes-or statutes with provisions that have proven impractical in the
light of experience-in the face of congressional gridlock. And a robust waiver
regime can channel departures from the rules set by Congress through a process
that promotes political accountability and deliberation. NFIB's Spending Clause
ruling might be criticized along many dimensions, 67 but the ruling's effects in
promoting federalism by waiver are likely to be salutary.
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